The formal concept of Crew Resource Management (CRM) training can be traced back to a workshop conducted in 1979 by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (Cooper, White, & Lauber, 1979). This workshop was based on research that identified the leading causal factors for the majority of air accidents as being related to human aspects – i.e. failures of interpersonal communications, decision making and leadership (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999).
Although this workshop first labelled CRM as Cockpit Resource Management, the notion of crews actually working together – and not individually, is not new. Provisions had been made in the design and operability of earlier aircraft for a co-pilot (and other crew members) to support the pilot with the intention to “reduce individual workload and decrease the probability of human error” (Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). This earlier form of “support” though was understood to have been more focused on pilot backup as opposed to the CRM concept of pilot and crew working as a team (Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). Gone were the days of a fully independent pilot commanding a plane as aircraft had become more complicated and therefore the operational requirements exceeded the skills of a single individual. Co-pilots, and other flight crew, were now needed and this demanded the training of new skills relating to the management, communications and workflows between those individuals.
This paper will firstly identify the generational changes that have occurred to the CRM concept and will explain how these developments (and wider industry acceptance) have resulted in the “rebranding” of this concept to the now more general term of Non-Technical Skills (NTS) training. As with many types of training, various forms of research have been conducted that have highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of CRM/NTS training and these aspects will be discussed.
The recognition of CRM/NTS training by other sectors is an exciting development of the original concept and this contextual expansion (and resulting future requirements) will also be discussed.
The aviation sector has grown from the days when an aircraft was operated by a single adventurous pilot making all the decisions to now become a complex system with all operations being coordinated by a collection of professionals working in a crew (or team) centric environment. This formal recognition of crew-based resourcing led to the identification of CRM training which resulted in the introduction of a range of multidisciplinary fields into the training process. These multidisciplinary fields consist of “methods and principles of the behavioral and social sciences, engineering and physiology (as a means) to optimize human performance and reduce human error” (Helmreich & Foushee, 2010).
John K. Lauber, member of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), defines CRM as “using all available resources – information, equipment and people – to achieve safe and efficient flight operations” (Salas, et al., 1999). By including the multidisciplinary fields into the training processes, pilots (and respective crew members) would be able to effectively and safely address the “situational, sociopsychological and other factors that influence aircrew performance” (Salas, et al., 1999).
The concept of CRM training has undergone a variety of generations with each generation further enhancing the original framework. Helmreich et al. (1999) identified five generations as:
- First generation – commenced in 1981 and “being psychological in nature, with a heavy focus on psychological testing and include general concepts as leadership” and consisted of awareness-based classroom activities combined with full mission simulator training,
- Second generation – emerged in the late 1980s and introduced a more “modular course structure with emphasis on team building”. Name changed to “Crew Resource Management” and included skills-based learning related to briefing and decision-making strategies, situation awareness and stress management – and was presented as intensive seminars with role-playing activities,
- Third generation – began in the early 1990s and “started to reflect on the environment in which the aircrews operate”. This systemic approach included the addition of organisational cultural and climate factors with some airlines choosing to extend this training to flight attendants, dispatchers and maintenance personnel,
- Fourth generation – followed the FAA’s Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and “began the integration and proceduralization of CRM” therefore formally requiring carriers to implement specific CRM training programs that meet operational needs, and,
- Fifth generation – (as advocated by Helmreich et al. (1999)) including a focus on error management on the recognition that “failures, mistakes and errors will occur”, and therefore train operational personnel to “expect, recognise and manage those risks”, Helmreich et al. (1999).
A sixth generation was further identified in 1999 which closely builds upon the previous generation to now include aspects relating to Threat and Error Management (TEM). This generation of CRM training “reflects the fact that flight crews must not only cope with human error within the cockpit but also with threats to safety that come from the operating environment” (Flight Safety Australia, 2006). Robert Sumwalt (2009), NTSB board member, defines threats as devices that “increase error potential (and can) put holes in or weaken our barriers against error”.
Addressing the safety and performance of personnel in crew or team centric environments is not limited to the immediate cockpit area – nor to the aviation industry in general. The medical community have begun to utilise CRM training for personnel in high risk environments (e.g. operating theatres, emergency rooms and intensive care units). Additionally, firefighting agencies, nuclear power providers and offshore oil producers are also training employees using CRM concepts (Salas, Wilson, Burke, & Wightman, 2006).
Initially introduced to provide instruction on good interpersonal relationship skills in the cockpit, the CRM concept has grown to become a defined learning program for a variety of team environments. The organisational requirement for teams to effectively co-ordinate human performance and resources while also managing risks, threats and errors is vital in certain environments and such training fulfils this need. This requirement also reflects on the core principle of Reason’s “swiss cheese” model of accident causality (Reason, 1997) in that “despite the best laid plans and best designed systems, there will inevitably be failures, mistakes and errors” (Martinussen & Hunter, 2009). Therefore, the training of employees working in high risk team centric environments in being able to co-ordinate personnel and resources while having the ability to manage risk, threat and error is vital in countering any possible deficiency that may occur.
While the CRM labelling of this concept is well defined and accepted (within the aviation sector), the actual terminology is not accurate in the many environments where personnel are not referred to as crew. As an example (and as already mentioned), operating theatres use CRM training techniques but workers in such environments are identified as “the Surgical Team” (The John Hopkins University, 2018). To assist in generalizing the CRM concept, the term “Non-Technical Skills training” has been introduced as a generic term for the variety of training programs that are “designed to enhance knowledge and performance related to the human dimension of work” (Murphy, 2017). Wilson et al., (2009) define non-technical skills as including the “cognitive and social skills…which are not directly related to…standard operating procedures.” This definition (and resulting “rebranding”) broadly redefines the CRM concept and extends the original framework – therefore, allowing other sectors to utilise this training model.
It is difficult though to accurately ascertain whether CRM (or NTS) training is successful or not. In other words, does this training result in a reduction in the number of incidents (alternatively, does it increase both safety and efficiency in crew or team-based environments). Helmreich et al. (1999) suggest that “due to the air accident rate being so low, and training programs are so variable..(it is)..difficult to draw strong conclusions…over a period of time”. This statement mirrors research undertaken by Salas et al. (2006) in which 28 separate studies concerning the effectiveness of CRM training (from multiple industries) were analysed and yet, due to the lack of specifics relating to actual skills being taught, it is “difficult to truly know why a particular CRM training program was a success or why it is not”.
This difficulty in being able to ascertain the success of the training could be defined as being a weakness of the CRM framework at an organisational level – that is, due to the amount of possible variables combined with the lack of defined quantitative attributes, there is no simple response that can be provided or used to confirm whether CRM training is actually successful in reducing incidents or not. Salas et al. (2006) do stress, that due to these factors, the evidence is “imperfect” and “it cannot be answered with certainity..(that)..CRM training has an effect on the bottom line: safety”.
From the perspective of the actual participants, the results of a survey of 20,000 flight crewmembers conducted by Helmreich & Foushee (2010) indicated that the training was “highly effective”. This survey also concluded with the positive finding that participants overwhelmingly felt that the training was “important and useful”. This counters research from the first generation of CRM training where some participants resisted the content and labelled such courses as “charm school” that attempted to manipulate their personalities (Helmreich et al. 1999).
The same research by Helmreich & Foushee (2010) did conclude with the finding though that there were measurable and positive changes in attitudes and behaviour following the introduction of CRM training. By using two distinct methods (the first being a self-reporting Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire – CMAQ; and second using observational data collected from independent assessors over a three year period), the researchers found shifts in “observed behaviour during line operations”. This positive cultural shift could indicate that CRM concepts “have become more widely accepted…and exert pressure on crewmembers to conform to the new strandards of behavior” (Helmreich & Foushee, 2010). Although these results show that the training was accepted and the course content was used by the participants, there is still no specific indication or metric on whether the training was actually effective in reducing incidents or not. However, the finding of participants classifying this training as important and useful (and also actually using the training) could be considered to be a positive, or strong aspect of the training.
One noteable deficiency of CRM training though concerns the export of formal CRM training programs to other locations – particularly to those locations that have different culture(s) at both organisational and national levels. This weakness is evident when exporting CRM training programs from a US based location to an Asian location where cultural norms recognise a different level of authority for managers – therefore making it difficult for lower ranked employees to question the decisions or actions of their leaders (Helmreich et al. 1999). This weakness is more explicit for carriers where the flight crew (and subsequent cabin crew) may consist of individuals representing a variety of cultures. In cases like this, the future onus would be on the respective carriers to implement customised CRM training that harmonises the concept with both their own organisational culture as well as the national culture(s) of the personnel that are represented in the organisation.
More organisations (and workplace environments) are now requiring increasing emphasis on safety and efficiency and therefore, it seems likely that the uptake for NTS training (based on CRM concepts) will increase. This may consist of further customization of the general framework so that national and organisational cultural aspects are addressed, as well as adaptations that reflect differing industrial environments and regulatory requirements. The basic concept will remain the same though – that is, including multidisciplinary fields into the training processes that “optimize human performance and reduce human error” (Helmreich & Foushee, 2010).
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) are now requiring national regulatory authorities (e.g. CASA, FAA, EASA etc) to legislate air operators in their respective jurisdictions to implement a recurring CRM training program (ICAO, 1998). The Australian regulator, CASA, have extended this requirement by legislating CRM training, not just for pilots and cabin crew, but also for “other safety-critical personnel..(and).. maintenance personnel” (CASA, 2012). This legislative requirement was also introduced in the European Union under EU No. 965/2012 which specifies commercial pilots and members of both technical and flight crew must also undertake recurring CRM training (European Parliament and of the Council, 2012). Additionally, the separate aircraft maintenance sector has adapted CRM training concepts to “meet the perceived needs of their aircraft maintenance professionals” (Patankar & Taylor, 2008). Each of these CRM training programs (and those from other industrial sectors) will need to be separately developed with the focus for each program reflecting on the operational, organisational and regulatory environments of the trainees.
CRM/NTS training is an exciting and logical concept that introduces a range of multidisciplinary fields into the training processes. The original emphasis on building leadership qualities in the cockpit has been further developed to now include systemic factors and strategies relating to Threat and Error Management (TEM). This contextual growth confirms the recognised and ongoing need for the training and development of behavioural processes that crews (or teams) must possess in order to ensure an effective and efficient relationship between safety and human performance.
While, there is no clear data indicating whether CRM/NTS training is actually effective in reducing incidents (or increasing safety), the notion of training behavioural and communicative aspects to personnel working in team centric environments is accepted at an employee level. There are cultural and organisational factors that may result in an uncertain outcome of the training though and these factors will need to be catered for in any form of future research that will occur on the concept and/or on the development of respective training programs being used.
The expansion of the CRM concept into other sectors is a positive sign which will lead into further development and conceptual growth, that when combined – will assist in creating safe, efficient work environments where human aspects can be relied upon to reduce threats, incidents or accidents.
References
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